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Autonomous wallet authorization

Production Fased does not open a broad timed wallet unlock session for Agent or Vault work. The old split-share/passphrase model—unlock a wallet for 15 to 60 minutes and let the runtime sign inside that window—is not the supported custody boundary. A compromised caller could change transaction intent during a broad unlock.

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Current model

  • Agent autonomy is durable, narrow signer policy with exact operations, programs, assets, destinations, and positive caps.
  • Mining autonomy is generated typed SAT operations only.
  • every manual native Agent, Mining, or Vault action uses one short-lived immutable review plus signer-owned WebAuthn;
  • hardware Wallet Standard or Turnkey supplies a separate manual custody lane.
  • The native signer persists request ids, digests, cap reservations, signed bytes, and broadcast/confirmed/failed/unknown state across restart. Each Gateway/Mining workflow must also persist and reuse its caller-owned request id; losing it is not permission to submit a replacement operation.

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Agent authorization

Agent authority stays active only while its acknowledged signer policy allows the exact request. Keep its balance and caps small. Installing a skill or creating a task is a separate operation and does not expand signer policy. To remove authority, stop new Gateway work and tighten the signer policy. There is no need to wait for a broad session TTL to expire.

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Mining authorization

Mining policy permits the generated SAT action set and configured SOL/SAT movement needed for fees, capital, claim, cleanup, and sweep. It does not authorize arbitrary SPL assets, generic sends, or serialized swaps.

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Manual native authorization

Vault actions and any separately enabled owner-review lane require a freshly prepared exact review. Agent and Mining automation inside narrow typed policy does not prompt for a passkey; requests outside policy are otherwise rejected. Signer-owned approval binds wallet, role, decoded transaction, policy hash, request id, nonce, and expiry and is consumed once. The optional Control UI account passkey under Account Security is separate Gateway authentication. It does not affect Agent or Mining readiness and cannot satisfy this signer challenge. A hardware Wallet Standard Vault instead signs that immutable review in the browser wallet; confirm transaction intent on-device. Turnkey relies on its independent provider policy.

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Pause and revoke procedure

  1. Use Agent or Mining Stop to reject new Gateway automation.
  2. Inspect signer request state for reserved, broadcast, or unknown work.
  3. Reconcile exact stored signatures/signed bytes; do not retry with changed parameters.
  4. Tighten signer policy through the owner/admin workflow.
  5. Remove or narrow skill grants and disable schedules.
  6. Sweep excess working value through a reviewed typed transfer.
  7. Review both Gateway and signer audit logs.
Stop is not key deletion, cap reset, transaction cancellation, or offline custody.

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Recovery events

Treat unexpected credential changes, signer policy hash changes, wallet-id or address mismatch, corrupt signer state, missing RPC hash, or an unknown broadcast as a stop condition. Preserve state and use the documented native recovery/reconciliation procedure; never delete state to obtain a fresh default. Useful checks: